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Abstract The objective of this paper is to analyze if there
is any difference between the light rail systems in Spain
according to whether they have been carried out through
public financing or private financing (totally or partially).
The importance of this study lies in the fact that, for dec-
ades, the public–private partnership has been proposed as
an alternative to public financing of public transport pro-
jects in order to obtain additional financial resources,
reduce the public deficit, and increase efficiency. However,
there are hardly any detailed studies describing how these
initiatives have turned out. Therefore, the present study
analyzes if there is any difference in the main variables
explaining the performance of light rail projects in Spain
depending on their source of funding can be found. For
this, the relationship between variables related to design,
operation and costs of the projects, and the percentage of
private financing were statistically analyzed. As the most
relevant conclusion, we underline the fact that the invest-
ment per passenger increases when financing is completely
private. This would indicate that the most cost-effective
lines, from a social standpoint, were financed totally or
partially by the public administrations, whereas the least
beneficial ones for society were assigned to private enter-
prises. This finding provides an advance in the knowledge
of the consequences of private participation in the financ-
ing of public transport projects, indicating, moreover, that
the biggest beneficiaries of this type of projects might be
the construction companies and the politicians involved.
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1 Introduction
Light rail (LR) systems in 13 Spanish cities (Valencia,
Alicante, Madrid, Barcelona, Parla, Sevilla, Vitoria, Bil-
bao, Murcia, Tenerife, Zaragoza, Jaén, and Vélez-Málaga)
are analyzed in order to study the possible influence of
private financing on the main variables explaining the
performance of such projects in Spain. In some cases, these
LR systems involved high costs of implementation and
operation far beyond the resources of the respective
financing entities (public administration and/or private
enterprise). Moreover, they are generally operating at a
much lower level of demand than the intended capacity [1].
Therefore, there is clearly a need to study the reasons
behind the success or failure of this novel means of
transport. Granted, such an analysis is very complex and
should be approached from diverse perspectives. The pre-
sent contribution focuses on the influence of private
financing in these projects to shed some preliminary light
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2 State of the Matter
Nowadays, a main reason for using private funding to
finance infrastructures that were traditionally publicly
funded is the strict deficit policy put in place by the
European Economic and Monetary Union [2, 3]. In this
context, a mechanism met with enthusiasm was the public–
private partnership (PPP)—the participation of private
enterprises in financing, building, and/or operating trans-
port infrastructures of public interest. Cullingworth [4]
found private financing to be particularly beneficial when
public expenditure is unlikely or impossible to obtain, as
long as resources are intelligently allotted.
This is a subject matter that should have stirred up
considerable debate. Glaister [5] states that, despite pro-
gress in using the PPP model, involvement on the part of
the private sector has occasionally led to a waste of
resources. In other words, privately funded projects might
incur higher costs. It is therefore logical that part of the risk
be borne by the private participation. Addressing the
public–private partnership (PPP) of the London Under-
ground, Shaoul et al. [6] explain it was not viable in eco-
nomic terms and holds that such projects entail too much
risk and not enough cash for the private sector. Also in a
British context, Panayiotou and Medda [7] studied means
of attracting private investment for infrastructures despite
the potential risks, concluding that a regulatory framework
is essential to attract private resources. Further criticism of
the PPP alludes to a lack of proper assessment a priori of
the costs of private financing [8]; Hodge and Greve [9] and
Shaoul et al. [6] note that PPP does not really represent
new funding opportunities, since in the end, taxpayers and
users pay the bill. Church [10] describes a practical case
(London Docklands LR) where private financing implied
neglecting the needs of citizens in order to attend to other
more profitable matters.
Weihe [11] looks at the synergy between public and
private partners in PPP projects, concluding that in most
cases benefits are smaller than expected, mainly due to a
lack of collaboration. A more quantitative approach (based
on Value for Money) is applied to a selection of PPP
projects by Hodge and Greve [9]; while the results vary
between success and failure, the authors acknowledge a
lack of scientific rigor in studies surrounding these projects.
In Spain, the participation of private enterprise in the
financing, construction, and exploitation of urban and
metropolitan railways extended rapidly after the conces-
sion of the LR in Barcelona, in the year 2003. Over half of
the LR systems developed since then have relied on the
build–operate–transfer procedure. Sastre [12] compares the
development of the LR in Spain undertaken by private
management and financing through concessions, as
opposed to public financing and management, pointing out
the pros and cons of each system, and how determinant the
setting or environs may be. The franchisee consortia for
this type of project generally comprise construction com-
panies, transportation operators, financial institutions,
rolling stock manufacturers, and/or engineering consultants
[13].
3 Light Rail Transit Systems in Spain
The present study focuses on 11 Spanish cities, as the LR
systems of Jaén and Vélez-Málaga are not functional at
present, due to low demand and a lack of funding.
3.1 Madrid
Madrid has three LR lines (ML1, ML2, and ML3). ML1 is
a stand-alone line that runs between the metro stations of
Pinar de Chamartı́n and Las Tablas. It provides service to
the new neighborhoods of Sanchinarro and Las Tablas,
whose development has greatly benefited from the devel-
opment of this means of transport [14]. This line spans
5.4 km and features 3.62 km of cut and cover tunnel. The
construction of new neighborhoods near the line can be
considered ‘‘low intensity’’ development; the fact that
several plots are still empty has contributed to the low
demand for this line.
The concession for works, financing, and exploitation of
ML1 was awarded to the bid submitted by Metros Ligeros
de Madrid S.A., whose shareholders were Metro de
Madrid, the infrastructure management company Glob-
alvia, and the transportation company Alsa. The required
investment was 277 M€ [15], which is equivalent to a unit
cost of more than 51 M€/km. This is an extremely high
price tag, largely owing to the proportion of the line built
underground. A good part of this additional cost could have
been avoided, given that the area was still under develop-
ment, and the LR could have easily been integrated into the
surface infrastructure.
ML2 runs along the outskirts of Madrid from the sub-
way station of Colonia Jardı́n (common station with ML3)
to the commuter station of Aravaca, passing through the
town of Pozuelo de Alarcón. It provides service to office
buildings, shopping malls, and university campuses.
Except for its two end stations, ML2 covers a sparsely
populated area with no chance of being urbanized. Its
demand is rather low: 3.7 million passengers in 2011 [16].
The investment was 283 M€ [15], which amounts to
roughly 32 M€/km. This elevated cost can be attributed to
the many underpasses and overpasses built to avoid road
level crossings. Many of them could have been avoided by
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changing the layout to have some level crossings with
traffic light priority for the LR.
ML3 runs from the metro station of Colonia Jardı́n to
Boadilla del Monte. Its length is 13.7 km, just 1.4 km of
them underground. This interurban radial line provides
service to leisure areas, office buildings, and university
facilities. Like ML2, ML3 runs through sparsely populated
areas, with the exception of both ends. The investment was
286 M€ [15], approximately equivalent to a unit cost of
20 M€/km. This is an extremely high cost for a line that
runs on surface, due to the same reason mentioned for
ML2.
The concession for the construction and operation of
ML2 and ML3 was awarded to Metro Ligero Oeste S.A.,
whose shareholders were the construction and infrastruc-
ture management companies OHL and Comsa, and the
investment group Ahorro Corporación [17].
3.2 Parla
Parla is a dormitory town located just south of Madrid. The
City Council of Parla contributed 33% of the investment,
essentially through the application of a tax for the new
urban district of Parla Este, built around the new line. The
remaining investment was previously provided by the
franchisee, also responsible for the design, construction,
and operation of the line. The awarded company was
Tranvı́a de Parla S.A.; their shareholding pertains to
Globalvia, the rail transport company Detren, and the bank
Caja Castilla La Mancha [17]. Although a portion of this
line runs through the center of Parla, it mostly runs along
the outskirts of town, providing service to some industrial
areas and the neighborhood of Parla Este, a district with
numerous unbuilt plots.
3.3 Barcelona
Barcelona has two independent LR networks: Trambaix
and Trambesós. Each comprises three lines running
through densely populated areas, with high demand.
Tramvia Metropolitá S.A. was the concession holder for
Trambaix; their responsibilities were drafting the project
and undertaking the civil works and the exploitation of the
lines. Tramvia Metropolitá S.A. is a consortium formed by
the company of railway rolling stock Alstom, the con-
struction and infrastructure management companies FCC,
Comsa and Acciona, the transport operators Veolia,
Moventis, FCC and Detren, the financial institutions Banco
de Sabadell and Société Fenérale (6%), and the public
transportation operators FGC and TMB [18]. The conces-
sion holder for Trambesós was Tranvı́a Metropolitá del
Besós S.A., whose shareholding is the same as Tramvia
Metropolitá S.A. [18, 19].
3.4 Bilbao
This LR was promoted and funded by the public company
Bilbao Rı́a 2000, the Autonomous Government of Paı́s
Vasco, and the City Council of Bilbao. In addition to
helping improve public transport, a main objective of the
project was the urban regeneration of the zone (previously
an industrial area) while boosting the image of Bilbao and
its new Guggenheim Museum.
3.5 Tenerife
The LR network of Tenerife has two connected lines. Both
traverse heavily populated zones and provide service to
hospitals, museums, university centers, and interchange
stations. The company in charge of contracting and
directing the works was Metropolitano de Tenerife. This
joint enterprise is owned by Tenemetro, which is integrated
by the construction sector, transportation operators, and
engineering consultancy companies, as well as the bank
CajaCanarias and the public administration Cabildo Insular
de Tenerife [20, 21]. Tenemetro is likewise responsible for
the operation of the tram over a 50-year concession. The
high unit cost of Line 1 (almost 22 M€/km) is due mostly
to the complicated topography of the area.
3.6 Zaragoza
The LR line of Zaragoza links very populated areas: the
historic city center and the two main nodes of urban
sprawl. The construction and operation of the line were
awarded by concession to a mixed society called Traza,
integrated by the City Council of Zaragoza plus a set of
civil engineering companies, rolling stock companies,
transportation operators, and banks: FCC, Acciona, CAF,
Tuzsa, Ibercaja, and Concessia [22].
3.7 Vitoria
The only LR line in Vitoria connects the neighborhoods far
from the city center with the downtown area. Investment
came from the Autonomous Government of Paı́s Vasco, the
Provincial Council of Alava, the City Council of Vitoria,
and the public railway company Eusko Trenbideak–Fer-
rocarriles Vascos S.A. [23].
3.8 Murcia
The limited demand of the LR of Murcia can be attributed
to the fact that it traverses low-density areas, such as uni-
versity schools, industrial areas, and sparsely populated
areas with neighborhoods of single family homes. The
investment was provided by the franchisee (Tranvı́a de
Urban Rail Transit
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Murcia) in exchange for an exploitation lasting 40 years
[24]. The shareholding of the franchisee pertains to the
construction companies FCC and Comsa [25].
3.9 Valencia
The Valencia LR network consists of Line 4, which con-
nects areas of high demand—the university campus and
Playa de la Malvarrosa—to the underground network, and
Line 6, which circumvents Valencia. The LR in Valencia
was built directly by the Generalitat Valenciana, using
public funds. The public railway company Ferrocarrils de
la Generalitat Valenciana (FGV) operates it [16].
3.10 Alicante
Most of the LR networks in Alicante (5 lines) come from
the transformation of a former narrow-gauge railway. It is a
tram train that connects Alicante with towns bordering on
the metropolitan area [26]. It was funded and built directly
by the Regional Government [16]. The agency responsible
for its exploitation is FGV.
3.11 Sevilla
The LR in Sevilla is limited to one short line from the
historic city center to San Bernardo, where commuter and
metropolitan bus stations are located. It supports a high
demand, as it runs through the most emblematic streets of
Sevilla, where it circulates at a very low speed so that
tourists can use it to see the area quietly and comfortably.
Funding came from the City Council of Sevilla and the
Autonomous Government of Andalucı́a. Its operation
depends on Tussam, the municipal transportation company
[16]. The fact that it runs entirely on surface through his-
toric areas implied important works for the redevelopment
of the traversed streets, which explains its high cost.
Table 1 offers a summary of the main variables and data
for these LR systems.
4 Methodology
Before proceeding, it should be stressed that the variable
percentage of private financing adopts just five different
values (Table 1). In view of the data, these five values
could be grouped as three: no private financing (near 0%),
partial (around 67%), or total private financing (100%). For
this reason, a classic approach such as regression of the
data (or other statistical models) may not result effective. A
more appropriate option would be to group the variable of
private investment into two or three groups and evaluate
the differences among them, for each of the remaining
variables. After trying different data groupings, the one
proving most adequate in terms of statistical efficiency was
distinguishing the LR systems totally or partially financed
by the public administrations (Group 1: Parla, Bilbao,
Tenerife, Zaragoza, Vitoria, Valencia, and Alicante) and
those whose financing was totally private (Group 2:
Madrid, Barcelona, and Murcia).
5 Data Analysis
5.1 Descriptive Analysis
According to Table 2, the mean is higher (taking as the
value of reference 10%) in the group of totally private
financing for the variables total investment, percentage of
underground length, unitary investment, operation costs,
operation costs per kilometer, investment per passenger,
and fare. Contrariwise, there are lower mean values in the
group of totally private financing for the variables annual
demand and maximum capacity.
A look at the box plots (Fig. 1) reveals that some vari-
ables take on values situated in a higher range in one group
than in the other. The extreme cases (e.g., the third quartile
of Group 1 being equal to or lesser than the first quartile of
Group 2) are percentage of length underground, operation
costs, investment per passenger, and fare. In contrast, for
variables such as annual demand and maximum capacity,
the opposite occurs: the first quartile of Group 1 is far
superior to the first quartile of Group 2.
5.2 Data Heterogeneity Treatment
The pursued objective of explaining the differences
between types of financing could be affected by other
relationships involving the data. Since all of the variables
are numerical, it is easy to visualize the magnitude of these
relationships with a correlation matrix (Fig. 2). To avoid
bias, only certain informative variables are considered.
More precisely, operation costs and total investment are
left out because they are absolute values and can lead to
misinterpretations; they have to be contextualized, in this
case divided by length.
There are certain strong relationships that should be
taken into account: investment per kilometer is highly
correlated with the percentage of underground sections,
operation cost per kilometer is negatively correlated with
network length, and minimum frequency appears to be
negatively correlated with investment per kilometer and
demand.
To confirm these findings, a Kendall Tau test was per-
formed on all the variables in Fig. 3. This is a means of
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































variables using a nonparametric test based on the number
of concordant and discordant pairs. As shown in Fig. 3,
there are statistically significant relationships between:
• Demand and maximum capacity
• Demand and maximum capacity, and minimum
frequency
• Operation cost per kilometer and network length
• Investment per kilometer and minimum frequency
• Investment per kilometer and maximum capacity.
Having discovered some important relationships, addi-
tional considerations must be taken into account at this
point to determine all of them. Several variables take few
different values, namely, percentage of underground sec-
tions (six), minimum frequency (five), and fare (six). Fur-
thermore, because most of the six values for percentage of
underground sections are zero (nine times), it would be
better to discretize it in two classes (partially or totally on
surface) to discern the real implications of these variables
on the others. The same process was applied to minimum
frequency, dividing it into high frequency (5 and 6 min,
which represent 9 out of 14 instances) and low frequency
(7–10 min). Fare values are more uniformly distributed
(maximum of three times for a single value to appear), so
they were not discretized.
The Kruskal–Wallis test was applied to all the variables
under this grouping of discrete variables in order to reject
the null hypothesis of both groups following the same
distribution. Resulting p values are given in Table 3.
As shown in Table 3, significant differences in the value
distribution by groups can be found for investment per
passenger (grouped by percentage of underground sec-
tions), while marginally significant differences were found
for investment per kilometer and for maximum capacity
(grouped by minimum frequency).
In sum, all these relationships should be taken into
account when performing further analysis, described
below.
5.3 Non-parametric Contrasts
The usual statistical inference tests, such as ANOVA or
linear regression, which might be ideal for the objective of
this study, require strong assumptions on normality and
homoscedasticity. Unfortunately, such assumptions cannot
be made in this case; the amount of data is too small and
normality and homoscedasticity tests would be insufficient,
making further tests ineffective. Nonparametric contrasts
may be used as a substitute to determine whether there are
statistically significant differences between the group dis-
tributions. The decision to apply these contrasts to all the
variables was based on the fact that, although some do not
appear to have evidence against the normality of the data, it
cannot be known for certain if such small sample sizes
provide normality. Therefore, the Wilcoxon–Mann–Whit-
ney nonparametric test was applied. The end intention is to
determine whether the distributions are equal, or rather, the
numbers are more likely to be larger in fully privately
financed networks. Thus, the hypotheses of the test are:
H0: G1 and G2 are equally distributed
H1: G2 is stochastically greater than G1.
Bearing in mind the results shown in Table 4, the final
conclusion is that the hypothesis of equality of distributions
at the 95% confidence level is rejected for the variables
percentage of line underground, investment per passenger,
and fare (in the latter case, the confidence interval is 99%).
It can be said that the investment per passenger, the per-
centage of underground network, and the fare are greater
when the financing is totally private.
The focus now is on percentage of line underground
results, as this variable suffers the problem of few unique
values (described in Sect. 5.2). Using the same partition
(partially and totally on ground), cross-tabulation was
made with the private financing partition. The results are
given in Table 5.
Table 5 shows evidence of differences in underground
percentage according to the financing type. A Fisher exact
test of independence was performed to contrast the
hypothesis of the Odds Ratio being no greater than 1,
meaning that the probability of a light rail network having
an underground section is not increased when financing is
totally private. The p value of the test was 0.06294, so this
hypothesis can be rejected with a confidence level of
93.7%.
6 Analysis of Results
6.1 Total Investment
According to the descriptive analysis (Table 2), the mean
total investment is greater when the financing is totally
private. This could be interpreted as an indication that
public administrations resort to private funding for more
expensive LR projects. Theoretically, this kind of funding
is a solution when public administrations do not have
sufficient budgetary resources for the construction and
commissioning of a project necessary for society. Assum-
ing equal efficiency between public administration and
private enterprise, such projects prove more expensive than
when faced by the public administration alone, as the pri-






bFig. 1 Box plots by variables, according to financing group
Fig. 2 Heat map of correlations
between nontype of financing
variables
Fig. 3 Kendall’s Tau test




6.2 Length of Line Underground
While LR is considered ideal for surface circulation
because of its accessibility and optimal urban integration,
some of the lines studied were built partially underground,
meaning decreased accessibility and soaring costs. Here, a
comparison of means and the box plot analysis (Fig. 1)
shows that the percentage of underground length is greater
in those projects financed completely with private capital.
Moreover, the nonparametric contrasts reveal differences
according to whether the funding is totally private or not.
This leads one to surmise that LR systems financed and
built with private capital tend to overuse the underground
option, which heightens the cost. That extra cost is
recovered by means of the subvention that the public
administration grants for the construction or exploitation of
such lines, as the firms funding the project are usually also
the ones commissioned for subsequently operating the
system [14].
6.3 Unit Investment
According to the descriptive analysis, the mean of the unit
investment cost is greater when funding is totally private. It
may be that more expensive projects—for instance, those
having a greater underground length, as demonstrated in
5.3—are preferentially financed with private capital, or else
the LR systems funded with private capital end up being
more expensive due to the industrial gain that private
agents must derive from their investment.
6.4 Operation Cost
The comparison of means (Table 2) and the box plots
(Fig. 1) indicate that operation costs tend to be higher in
those LR systems that are totally funded through private
initiatives. This may be, at least in part, because the
underground length is greater in the LRs financed totally
with private capital. Underground systems involve addi-
tional costs: moving stairs, illumination, ventilation, con-
trol of access, security/vigilance, tunnel maintenance, etc.
6.5 Annual Demand
The descriptive analysis (Table 2) shows that the annual
demand is greater in the LRs whose funding is totally or
partially from the public administrations. This means that
public financing is tied to the projects most necessary for
society, whereas the projects financed solely with private
capital have led to the construction of LRs under less
demand by society.
6.6 Maximum Capacity
The comparison of means (Table 2) and the box plots
(Fig. 1) show that the LRs involving public funding usually
have a greater maximum capacity. It may be that the sys-
tems financed entirely with private capital and operated by
private companies try to restrict supply in order to lower
costs and therefore increase benefits.
6.7 Investment per Passenger
Both the correlation coefficient (Fig. 2) and the descriptive
statistics (Table 2), as well as all the contrasts (Sect. 5.3),
come to show that the investment per passenger is greater
Table 3 Kruskal–Wallis test
p values for differences between
groups in each variable
Length Underground Investment/km Operation cost Operation cost per kilometer
Kruskal–Wallis test p value grouping by percentage of underground sections
0.841 0.000 0.123 0.796 0.606
Annual demand Max. Capacity Invest/pass. Min. Frequency Fare
0.385 0.738 0.045 0.533 0.136
Kruskal–Wallis test p values grouping by minimum frequency
0.504 0.938 0.064 0.796 0.439
Annual demand Max. Capacity Invest./pass. Min. Frequency Fare
0.204 0.071 0.758 0.002 0.542
Table 4 Non-parametric test of equality of distributions





Operation cost per km 0.452
Annual demand 0.801
Maximum capacity 0.756





when the financing is totally private. This indicates that the
most beneficial projects from a social standpoint were
undertaken totally or partly with public capital, whereas the
socially less beneficial projects tend to rely on private
capital. Also, the contrasts reveal that projects with a
greater investment per passenger have a higher percentage
of line underground, which builds a three-way relationship
between factors. The interpretation could be that invest-
ment per passenger is higher when financing is fully private
because of the higher amount of underground sections
those projects present.
6.8 Fare
The correlation coefficient (Fig. 2), the comparison of
means (Table 2) and the box plot analysis (Fig. 1) all show
that the fare is more expensive when the projects were
totally funded with private capital. Moreover, the non-
parametric contrast (Sect. 5.3) corroborates that there is a
difference depending on whether the funding was totally
private or not. Accordingly, the concession for exploitation
of LR lines to private firms generally gives rise to higher
fares. This might be explained by the fact that the private
concessionary firms (the same ones that financed the pro-
ject) need to obtain an industrial benefit and also because of
the greater facility to obtain subsidies when public
administrations are involved in the financing and
exploitation of the system.
7 Conclusions
This study looked into the possible influence exerted by the
presence of private funding on the main variables
explaining the results of LR projects in Spain. Despite the
great simplification of approaching this matter through a
single variable, there is statistical evidence that the source
of funding may have an impact on such projects. Specifi-
cally, this influence is detected in the following variables:
total investment, unit investment, operation cost, operation
cost per km, annual demand, maximum capacity, and in a
statistically significant way in proportion of length under-
ground, fare, and investment per passenger.
In view of the results, it is noteworthy that the invest-
ment per passenger increases when financing is completely
private. This would indicate that the most cost-effective
lines, from a social standpoint, were financed totally or
partially by the public administrations, whereas the least
beneficial ones for society were assigned to private enter-
prises. It should be underlined that the annual demand in
the vast majority of light rail systems in neighboring
countries such as France [43] is much higher than in Spain.
Clearly, the advantages of LR as a transportation system do
not justify its implementation when demand is low, given
the high investment required. Nevertheless, high costs and
low demand are traits common to many LR systems in
Spain [1]. Their promotion was justified by unreliable (or
even nonexistent) viability studies—e.g., overestimating
demand, layout through scarcely populated areas—in
conjunction with very costly projects—unnecessary
underground sections, excessive crossings at different
levels, etc. At the root of such projects, there may lay
political impulses and opaque intentions, with certain
sectors or parties benefiting from the introduction of a
modern means of transport in their city. Here is where the
vast influence of Spains major banks and construction
companies upon the public administration would come into
play: strategic alliances may appear between public powers
and private enterprise, launching very costly projects, for
the benefit of both, at the expense of the taxpayer. It has to
be noticed that these kinds of projects usually include the
urbanization of new areas, the redevelopment of existing
ones and the improvement in a city’s image, reasons that
usually play an important role in the development of LR
systems [3, 13, 14].
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Table 5 Contingency table of
underground and on surface
networks and their financing
type
Partly or totally public financing Totally private financing
Totally on ground 7 2
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32. Oromi P (2007) El tranvı́a vuelve a Tenerife. Cimbra: Revista del
Colegio de Ingenieros Técnicos de Obras Públicas 378:20–31
33. Vı́a Libre (2009) Tranvı́a de Tenerife. http://www.vialibre-ffe.
com/pdf/tenerife_dossier526.pdf. Accessed 15 May 2015
34. Vı́a Libre (2013) Primer aniversario del Tranvı́a de Zaragoza:
11.5 millones de viajeros. http://www.vialibre-ffe.com/noticias.
asp?not=8763. Accessed 18 Dec 2015
35. Ayuntamiento de Zaragoza (2013) Tranvı́a de Zaragoza dossier
de prensa. http://www.zaragoza.es/ciudad/noticias/detalle_Noti
cia?id=84748. Accessed 22 May 2015
36. Montesinos MJ (2012) Tres millones de viajeros en un año. http://
www.laverdad.es/murcia/v/20120527/murcia/tres-millones-via
jeros-20120527.html. Accessed 27 Jan 2015
37. Levante-EMV (2012) El tranvı́a, una extensión del Metro. http://
www.levante-emv.com/especiales/transportes-valencia/2012/08/
tranvia-extension-metro-n66_12_1613.html. Accessed 28 Sept
2015
38. Julián A (2012) Tranvı́a de Valencia. Vı́a Libre. http://www.via
libre-ffe.com/pdf/11732_pdf_04.pdf. Accessed 28 Sept 2015
39. Vı́a Libre (2013) El tranvı́a de Valencia supera los cien millones
de viajeros. http://www.vialibre-ffe.com/noticias.asp?not=10339.
Accessed 17 Oct 2015
40. Ferrocarrils de la Generalitat Valenciana (2013) www.fgv.es.
Accessed 28 Sept 2015
41. TUSSAM (2013) Caracterı́sticas del Tranvı́a. http://www.tussam.
es/index.php?id=166. Accessed 1 April 2015
42. Constenla T (2006) Obras públicas aportará para el Metrocentro
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